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ABSTRACT 
Overreaction is a common investor problem that heavily occurs due to irrationality on the part 
. :~of the investor. According to Kahneman and Tversky, investors tend to be risk seeking in losses 
:and risk averse in gains, a realization that led to the genesis of the Prospect Theory. Moreover, 
·: studies have identified that the Efficient Market Hypothesis is not a perfect tool in determining 
· investor reaction. Therefore this study purposed to analyze the existence of overreaction in the 
Nairobi Securities Exchange through use of a model Swallow {1998) that analyzes stock 
abnormal returns, checks for their persistency and also examines if they are driven by 
overreaction. According to the findings, the market was deemed to be in the weak form of 
~fficiericy hence abnormal returns being experienced were persistent. Further, overreaction 
was observed in losses and not in gains, hence affirming the findings of the Prospect Theory. 
Overall,. in comparison to the Portuguese market, similar findings were obtained hence leading 
to the conclusion that behavioral biases do play a role in investor decision making and it is 
imperative for investors to be well educated before investing and to take up effective hedging 
strategies to mitigate against the negative effects of stock losses. 
Table of Contents 
.. 
1. CHAPTER ONE .......... .. ..... ... .... .................. ... .... .... .... .......... .. ... ... ....... ........ ..... .... .......................... . , ... 7 
1.1. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY ... ... ... ... .. ........ ....... .. .... .... ... ........ ... .... .. ... ..... .... ........... ... ...... ... ... . 7 
1.2. Problem Statement .. .... ..... .... .. .. ... ... ... ..... ...... ..... ... .. .... ..... ...... ... ...... .... ... .... ..... .. ...... ... ..... ...... ... 8 
'-
1.2. Research Objectives ...... .... ............ ......... ....... .. ...... ... .... .................. ...... ... ...... .................. ::······· 8 
1.3. Research Questions ...... ... .. ...... .. ... ...... .... ....... .. .... ..... .... ........ .... ..... .... ...... ... .... .... .. ........ ...... ." ..... 8 
1.4. Justification of the study:'· · .. .... ... ..... .. .... ... ..... .. ...... ... ... ..... .... .... .... .... .. .... .. .. ............. ..... ........ .... 8 
2. CHAPTER TWO ......... .. .. .. ...... .. ... ...... ............ .... ...... ....... .. .. .. ...... ....... ..... .... .. .. .. ... .... ... ...... .... .... ... .... ... 9 
2.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW ..... ... .. .......... ................. ...... .... ...... ..... .. 9 
2.1.1. Introduction ... ....... .... .. ....... .... .. .... .. .... ... ... .. .. ... ... ... ..... .... ..... ............ ... .. .. ... ...... .. ...... .. ...... . 9 
2.1.2. Efficient Market Hypothesis .. ........ ....... ... .... .... .......... ... .. .... .... ... ..... ...... ............................. 9 
2.1.3. Foundations Qf behavioral finance ...... .... .... ...... ... ....... ....... ....... .......... .. ... .. .. ... .... ........ .... 10 
2.1.4. Prospect Theory ... ... ......... ... ...... .. ... ..... .... ..... .... ..... ... ......... ..... .... ... ..... ..... .......... .. ... ....... . 11 
2.2. Empirical Evidence .. :· .. ........ .. ... ...... ........ ......... .. ... ... ... .. ... ...... ..... .... ..... .... .. ........................... ... 12 
2.3. Key Research Gaps ... .... ... .. ... .... .... .... .. ................ .. ........ ........ .. ... ... ...... ..... ... .... .... .... .... ..... ....... 14 
2.4. Link-between studies .............. .................... ... ... ...... ........ .... .. ... ..... .... .. ... ... ...................... .... .... 15 
2.5. Conceptual Framework ... ...... ................. ..... ... ................... .... ...................... ..... ...... ........... .... . 15 
3. CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .. .. ........ .. ................ .. ..... .. .... .. ............ ... .... ..... ............ 17 
3.1. Nature of the study .... ....... ....... .. .. ....... .. ......... .... ... .... ....... .. .. .. ...... .. .......... .......... ... .. .. .... . 17 
3.2. Population ...... ......... ...... ... ...... .... .... .............. .. ...... .. ........ ............ .. ............... ..... .... .... ...... 17 
3.3. Data Collection ..... ........... ... ... ... .. ... ......... .... .. ......... .... .... .... .... .......... ...... ... .. ... ...... ..... ..... . 17 
3.4. Data Analysis ...... .............. .... .......... .. ...... ...... ... ..... .. .. .. ...... .. .......... .... .. ... .... .. ... ...... .. ... .. .. . 17 
3.4.1. Model Specification .................................................................................................................. 17 
3.4.2. Estimation of stock beta ................................. ; ................................ ............... .... .-..................... 17 
3.4.3. Estimation of stock expected returns .................................... ................................................ . 18 
3.4.4. Calculation of abnormal returns ............................................................................................. 20 
3.5. Tests for overreaction ............ ...................................................................................................... 22 
3.5.1. Formation ofthe winner, loser and arbitrage portfolio ............ ....................................... 22 
3.5.2. Cumulative abnormal return anal~:sis ........................................................ .. ................... . 23 
4. CHAPTER FOUR ................................................................................ : .......... ..................... ...... ........................ 23 
4.1. Analytical findings ................................. ...... ......... ...... .............................. .. .................................. 23 
5. CHAPTER FIVE ............ .. ............................................................................................................................... 27 
5.1. Discussion ............................................................................................................ ... ......................... 27 
5.2. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 28 
5.3. Recommendations ... ................................................................................................. : ....... ...... ....... 29 
Bibliography ................ .. .......... ......................................................................................... ... .................. 30 
1. CHAPTER ONE 
1.1. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
Behavioral finance is a fiel.d that is being explored to help In determining the impact of investor 
biases,·· preferences- and opinions have on their investment patterns. Sewell(2007} defines 
behavioral finance. as the s~udy of the influence of psychology on the behavior of financial 
; practitioners and the subsequent effect on markets. In addition to that, Shefrin(2000} defines 
\: behavioral finance ·as a rapidly growing area that deals with the influence of psychology on the 
behavior of financial practitioners and the subsequent effect on markets. Thus, behavioral 
finance can be defined as a field of finance that proposes explanation of stock market 
anomalies using identified psychological biases rather than dismissing them as "chance results 
consistent with the market efficiency hypothesis" Fama(1998} 
Traditional finance, according to Fama & Eugene(1965} puts forward two main paradigms: 
Market agents are perfectly rational: any new available information is interpreted correctly and 
uniformly 
Markets are efficient: EMH states -all relevant information is reflected in prices instantaneously 
and completely. If the hypothesis holds, prices are right and there is no investment strategy 
which can earn excess risk-adjusted average returns consistently. 
However, as time has passed, we have seen traditional finance not being able to explain some 
situations that have occurred and keep recurring e.g. underperformance of Initial Public 
Offerings despite corporate announcement, The US Stock Market Crash that lasted a few hours 
after President Donald Trump was declared the winner of the 2016 US General Elections, why 
prices tend to go up in January despite strong monetary and fiscal policies among other factors. 
Kahneman & Tversky(1979}studied the behavior of investors and came up with the Prospect 
Theory that shows the trends investors take behaviorally e.g. being loss averse. This theory is 
' 
the cornerstone of behavioral finance. Moreover, he was able to identify some psychological 
biases that plagued investors e.g. Representativeness, Framing, Mental Accounting, Disposition, 
Hindsight, Endowment, Loss Aversion, Regret Aversion, Availability among others. This study 
shall seek to utilize the Prospect Theory to test for representativeness, overconfidence and 
regret aversion presence in investor decision making at the Nairobi Stock Exchange, Kenya. 
1.2. Problem Statement 
Standard finance has been heavily relied on to understand the financial markets' mechanism. 
However, it is not a perfect tool. Statman(1999) found that today's standard finance is so 
weighed down by anomalies to a point rebasing financial theory on behavioral patterns is . 
necessary. Heuristics are more commonly used to solve challenges in decision making 
processes. Harbaugh(2003} shows that simple economic models are often poor predictors of 
human behavior hence the need to study human behavior interactions in decision making 
process is paramount. Clare(1995) studied the London Stock Exchange over a ·period of 36 
months and was able to establish some overreaction; due to a small firni size effect. A similar 
study had beeniundertaken in Kenya in the previous decade. However, this had not been t ested 
in Kenya over :the current decade given the economic changes that have occurred in the 
country e.g. since ineeption of the new constitution in 2010. Therefore, this study sought to 
establish whether investors at the Nairobi Securities Exchange overreact to information coming 
in and this was evaluated using secondary data and a model from Swallow(1998) that is based 
on the overreaction hypothesis. 
1.2. Research Objectives 
The objective of this study was to achieve the following: 
1. To test whether abnormal returns in the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) were 
persistent in line with t he weak form of market efficiency (EMH). 
2. To determine whether overreaction was the main driver of the abnormal returns in the 
NSE. 
1.3. Research Questions 
This study sought to answer the following questions: 
1. Were there persistent abnormal returns in the NSE consistent with the weak form of 
market efficiency (EMH)? 
2. Was overreaction the main driver of the abnormal returns in the NSE? 
1.4. Justification of the study 
This study shall be useful to market participants as it will provide insight on the prevalence of 
these behavioral biases to help enhance effective decision making. It will also be useful to 
compan ies as it will provide insight on the impact of the biases on investment decisions which 
will help companies know where to invest, how to invest under a more informed framework. 
Moreover, it will be useful to industry analysts as it will enable them incorporate the influence 
of such biases at analyzing trends in industries where investment decisions weigh heavily. 
2. CHAPTER TWO 
2.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1.1. Introduction 
Finance is defined as the study of the management of investments, and large amount of money 
especially by large companies and by governments. Investments can be in e.g. stocks, real 
estate etc. According to Fama & Eugene(1965) within traditional finance there are two key 
paradigms: 
Market ag'ents are perfectly rational- any new _available information is interpreted correctly and 
uniformly. 
Markets are ·efficient- EMH states all relevant ·information is reflected in prices instantaneously 
and completely. If the hypothesis holds, prices are right and there is no investment strategy 
which can earn excess risk-adjusted average returns consistently 
Subtahmanyam(2007) classifies the central paradigms of finance as: Portfolio allocation based 
on expected risk and return, Risk based asset pricing model e.g. Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), Pricing of contingent claims and Modiglianl- miller theory and its ' augmentation by 
theory of agency 
Traditional finance has been applicable since the advent of investment. However, it has failed 
to explain issues such as the following: 
The January Effect- an anomaly in the financial market where the prices of a security increase in 
the month of January without fundamental reasons. Rozeff{1976) 
The Win her's Curse- where the winning big in an auction tends to exceed intrinsic value of the 
item purchased . mainly due to incomplete information and emotions leading bidders to 
overestimating the item's value. Thaler(1988) 
2.1.2. Efficient Market Hypothesis 
An efficient market -is defined as a market where there are large number of rational, profit-
maximizing individuals actively competing with each other to predict future market values of 
individual securities and where important current information is almost freely available to all 
participants. Fama & Eugene(1965) 
Fama goes on to say that it would be impossible for a trading system based on currently 
available information to have excess returns consistently. 
Theoretical foundation of EMH is based on three key arguments: 
Investors ·are rational and value securities rationally. Moreover, in case some investors are 
· irrational; their trades are random and cancel each other out without affecting prices; 
furl:herriwre, rational arbitrageurs eliminate the influence of irrational investors on the market 
Shleifer(2000) points out two main categories that strengthen EMH. These are: any fresh news 
about a security should be reflected in its price promptly and prices should not move as long as 
there is no· new info about the company since it must be exactly equal to the value of the 
security 
Fama & Eugene(1965) distinguishes between three forms of EMH. Fh·st and foremost there is 
the weak form in which all past market prices, returns and , other information are fully 
incorporated in prices which renders technical analysis useless. Secondly, there is the semi 
strong form in which it is impossible for investors to earn superior returns using publicly 
available information hence rendering fundamental analysis useless. Moreover, there is the 
strong form iri which all information is reflected hence you cannot make superior returns from 
insider information. 
Seyhun(1998) notes that, however, there has been evidence that insiders did in fact earn 
abn·) rmal returns even when trading legally. In support of weak form of efficiency, Fama & 
Eugene(1965) found that stock prices follow a random walk pattern. Semi strong form was 
tested by event studies and this was facilitated by Fama(1969). 
EMH, however was heavily challenged. Grossman(1980) argued that it was impossible for 
efficient markets to exist since information has a cost associated with it and prices will not 
perfectly reflect available information since if it did, there would be no incentive for investors 
to spend money to obtain it. Moreover, Kahneman(1998) showed that people deviated from 
... 
the standard decision making model in key fundamental areas e.g. on areas based on varying 
risk appetite levels. 
Shiller(1984) and Summers(1986) provided empirical evidence to show that returns were 
predictable to some extent which contradicted the existing market mode! assumption of 
constant expected returns. 
2.1.3. Foundations of behavioral finance 
Sewell (2007) defines behavioral finance as the study of the influence of psychology on the 
behavior of financial practitioners and the subsequent effect on markets. 
Shefrin (2000) defines behavioral finance as a rapidly growing area that deals with the influence 
of 'psychology on the behavior of financial practitioners and the subsequent effect on markets. 
Thus, behavioral finance can be defined as a field of finance that proposes explanation of stock 
market anomalies using identified psychological biases rather than dismissing them as "chance 
results consistent with the market efficiency hypothesis" Fama(1998) 
Fama(1996)and others have shown that the basic facts about the aggregate stock market, the 
cross section average returns and individual trading behavior are not easily understood in the 
Traditional Finance and Modern Portfolio Theory framework. Kishore(2004) explains that 
behavioral finance emerged due to a relaxation of the two doctrines of traditional paradigm: 
Agents faii to update their' beliefs correctly 
There is a 'systematic deviation from the normative process in making investment choices. 
2.1.4. Prospect Theory 
The Prospect Theory:originated from the works of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky an·d is 
the cornerstone of behavioral finance. It argues that when choosing between gambles, people 
compute the gains <:md losses for each one and select the one with the highest prospective 
utility. It mainly focuses on the significance of investment losses as most investors ar,e loss 
averse hence investment losses must be compe~sated through the opportunity: for higher 
returns. It draws from the e)(pected utility theory by also having the characteristic of declining 
marginal utility of gains. 
Utility is the main function for this rather than wealth. In the prospect utility function graph, we 
can see that it is concave in gains and convex in losses representing risk aversion in gains and 
risk seeking in losses: Investors typically feel losses more than gains. The loss area reflects the 
declining marginal damage of the losses. This is because prospect utility proponents would risk 
their investment for a bre~k even opportunity rather than face a definite loss. 
If markets were efficient, as per Fama's theory, all investment returns would have normal 
distribution and the application of the mean standard deviation criterion would still be justified 
for prospect theory investors. However, in reality the efficient market hypothesis is not valid so 
very few investments have returns with normal distributions. 
When it comes to investment in stocks, the natural reference point is the purchase price of the 
stock and is one of the reference points used by an investor. Maximum stock prices in recent 
return history are found to affect investors trading decisions. In principle, this bias, kno,wn as 
framing, can be broad or narrow. It can be broad in the sense that it affects the investor's entire 
wealth function or narrow in the sense that it affects one of the mental accounts that the 
investor has. Vast majority of empirical studies, therefore, assume a degree of rationality in 
investment hence implicitly assume narrow framing. 
Hence, the loss aversion under prospect theory is key to an optimal portfolio. In order to study 
it more, we need to replace the efficient market line in the meari· standard deviation model 
with a behavioral efficient frontier based on the prospect theory. The behavioral efficient 
frontier was developed in a paper by Enrico De Giorgi, Thorsten Hens and Janos Mayer in 2011. 
It depicts the prospect theory using a risk- return diagram and offers various hedging strategies 
based on the investor's risk profile. 
If we compare prospect theory portfolios with the Markowitz portfolios we see that they have a 
iower portion of equities and hedge funds while weighting capital protection products more 
heavily. Equities and hedge funds are not largely represented in the prospect portfolios because 
of their potential huge losses. 
A major element of the prospect theory is the weighting function. The value of each outcome is 
multiplied by a decision weight. Decision weights measure the impact of events on the 
desirability of an investment. They are not probabilities and. typically do not add up to unity. 
Kahneman & Tversky(1979) call this property subcertainty 
swallow(1998) identified heuristics and behavioral biases e.g. representativeness, regret 
av~ersion, overconfidence, hindsight, availability bias among other biases as some of the key 
factors that lead to overreaction among investors. We shall seek to evaluate the two to gain 
some insight on them and how they can contribute to overreaction and irrationality in investor 
decision making. 
2.2. Empirical Evidence 
Rozeff &. Zamani(1998) carried out a study on overreaction and insider trading to provide 
evidence on whether market prices reflect investor overreaction. Cash flow and book value 
data from the annual compustat industrial tape is used over the years 1978 to 1991. The cash 
flow for year tis divided by the market value of equity at the end of May in year t+1. Market 
value of equity is the product of the number of shares outstanding and the end-of-may stock 
price, both of which are obtained from the Centre for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) 
Monthly NYSE-AMEX files. After obtaining a ratio of cash flow to market value of equity each 
year for each company, the companies are sorted into deciles each year. by the CF/P ratio and 
assigned a value of one to ten. Stocks ranked one have the loWest CF/P ratios and are called the 
growth stocks. Stocks ranked ten have the highest CF/P ratios and are called the value stocks. 
Returns of each stock in periods prior to May of year t+1 are found. Periods of 12 month and 36 
month are examined. The proportion of buy transactions in th'e insider trades is positively 
related to the ratio of cash flow to price (as well as book value to price) and negatively related 
to prior stock return. Outside investors, thus, overvalue growth stocks and undervalue value 
stocks. Insider transactions are consistent with a well-informed contrarian approach to stock 
investing. Insider buying climbs as stocks change from growth to value categories. Insider 
buying is also greater after low stock returns and lower after high stock returns. These findings 
are consistent with a vers,ion of overreaction which says that prices of value stocks tend to lie 
below fundamental values, and prices of growth stocks tend to lie above fundamental value. 
In a study of market efficiency, DeBondt & Thaler(1985) investigated whether such behavior 
affects stock prices. They used monthly return data for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
common stocks, as compiled by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) of .the 
University of Chicago, for the period between January 1926 and December 1982. An equally 
we ighted arithmetic average rate of return on all CRSP listed sec~rities serve as the market 
index. The results are consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. Loser portfolios of 35 stocks 
Outperform the market by, on average, 19.6%, 36 months after portfolio formation . Winner 
portfolios;' on the other hand, earn about 5% less than the market, so that the difference in 
cumulative average residual between the e.xtreme portfolios equals 24.6%. The findings have 
other notable aspects. Fi rst, the overreaction effect is asymmetric; it is much larger for losers 
. than for w·inners. Secondly, most of the excess returns are realiz:ed in January. Finally the 
overreaction phenomenon mostly occurs during the second and third year of the test period. 
' Zarowin(1989) tested whether the stock market overreacts to extreme earnings by examining 
firms' stock returns over t he 36 months subsequent to extreme earning years. Portfolios of 
firms that are characterized by extreme (good versus bad) current period earnings perfor:mance 
are formed and to comp9re the subsequent stock returns of the poorest earners versus the 
best earners. CRSP monthly return file and the Compustat Annual Industrial file is the data base 
for this study. Each year from 1971 to 1981 all firms meeting the following data requirements 
are included in the sample for th.at year: availability of the six consecutive prior years and the 
current year of ea r.nings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations; December 31 
fiscal year end and availability of price per share and number of shares outstanding on the CRSP 
monthly file at year end. To examine whether the stock market overreacts to extreme earnings 
news, the excess returns of the two extreme earnings portfolios over the 36 months 
subsequent to the extreme earnings year are compared. Results presented fail to support the 
overreaction to earnings hypothesis. Although the poorest earnings performers outperfo r,m the 
best earnings performers by a statistically significant 16.6% over the 36 months subsequent to 
the extreme earnings ye·ar, he argues that this result is due primarily to differences in size 
between the two groups. Poor earners tend to be smaller firms than good earners. When poor 
earners are matched with good earners of equal size there is little difference in return behavior. 
When poor (or good) earners of disparate sizes are compared, small firms outperform large 
firms, and smaller winners outperform larger losers. Thus the statistically significant differences 
between the returns of extreme prior period performers appear to be the result not of investor 
overreaction to earnings but of the size effect. This is in contrast with DeBondt(1987) who 
maintained, "The winner loser effect is not primarily a size effect". 
Clare (1995) carried out a study on "The overreaction hypothesis and the UK stock market". 
UK data is used from 1955 to 1990 drawn from a random sample of up to 1,000 stocks in any 
one year. Portfolios of stocks are formed on the basis of prior period performance. The 
portfolios are formed using stock return data taken from the London Business School LSPD 
tapes. The data base consists of the end month dividend adjusted returns on all those stocks 
!!sted on the London Stock Exchange since January 1955. Stocks are ordered into portfolios 
according to their performance relative to the performance of the market over three separate 
periods: one, two and three years. Then the market adjusted return for any month is 
calculated. Regression analysis on means of the winner and los~r portfolio returns is done. At-
test is carried out on the significance level. It is found that losers outperform previous winners 
over a two-year period by a statistically significant 1. 7% per annum. On further investigation it 
is found that such overreaction may in fact be a manifestation of the small firm effect. 
2.3. Key Research Gaps 
Clare(1995) evaluated stock data at the London Stock Exchange since January 1955 to 1990. She 
analyzed portfolios:based on short run performance. However, she was not able to perform ·an 
analysis on portfolios in the long run. Moreover, she identified that overreaction could have 
been caused by ·manifestation of the small firm effect. She did not endeavor to test how the 
small firm effect was singled out as a key factor that led to overreaction; hence leaving 
un~ertainty towards its implication on the rationale of an investor when making decisions . 
. Zarowin(1989) was able to expound on the effect of firm size and investor size on the various 
reactions of investors. He was able to identify stocks from small sized firms that were poor 
performers and compare their excess returns with those of similar firms and also larger firms 
that were better performers. Hence, he was able to find that the winner loser phenomenon 
was influenced to a certain degree by size of the firms. However, he was not able to identify to 
what degree firm size generally impacted the overreaction Witnessed in investor decision 
making and whether firm size was significant in leading to overreaction among investors. 
DeBondt & Thaler(1985) conducted a study where they found that the overreaction hypothesis 
was asymmetric in nature and that most overreaction was witnes.sed by losers compared to 
winners. This supports the Prospect Theory which shows that investors are risk averse in gains 
and risk seeking in losses. In his study he was able to find that the overreaction occurred within 
a period of 36 months of portfolio formation. However, he did not test the reaction of winners 
and losers over a longer period e.g. 5 year period which is the recommended base minimum of 
study since recent times hence running the risk of having skewed information due to a short 
I· 
range period. Moreover, he formed portfolios from as far back as 1925 yet his study was 
conducted in 1985. He therefore, ran the risk of having obsolete information due to changes in 
tre_nds and prevailing economic conditions over the span of time hence increasing potential of 
inaccuracy of results. 
Rozeff & Zamani (1998} examined the reaction of outside investors and investors who trade in 
~tacks. He was able to find that outside investors undervalued value stocks while they 
overvalued growth stocks. Moreover, he found that insider trading gradually went up as stocks 
turned from value stocks to growth stocks. These findings .are consistent with a version of 
overreaction which says that prices of value stocks tend to lie below fundamental values, and 
prices of growth stocks tend to lie above fundamental values. He conducted this study over 
periods of 12 -months and 36 months. Hence, he did not test this version of overreaction over a 
longer period of time e.g. a 5 year period which is the recommended base minimum of study 
since recent times. Hence, this study ran the risk of having highly skewed information due to 
having a short time frame. 
2.4. Link between studies 
This research attempted to use the Prospect Theory to test the presence of overreaction in 
Kenyan investors in the Nairobi Stock Exchange basing this on the overreaction hypothesis in a 
similar pattern to Clare {1995) who conducted a similar study at the London Stock Exchange but 
that hadn;t · been tested before in Kenya in the current decade {beginning 2010 onwards) in 
order to determin~ its significance on investor behavior at the Nairobi Stock Exchange. 
Most of the studies involved utilized mainly primary data in delivering their results. However, 
this research utilized mainly secondary data obtained from the monthly stock patterns in the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange and changes in stock prices were evaluated based on the occurrence of 
abnormal returns, basing it on an autoregressive model Swallow{1998) . Evaluation occurred 
based on activity of portfolios formed from stock of select compani~s whose activi!Y was 
monitored and an analysis conducted based on the f indings. 
The study_ provided insight on the presence of overreaction among Kenyan investors at the 
Nairobi Stock exchange through model analysis and demonstrated possible irrationality based 
on the overreaction hypothesis. 
2.5. Conceptual Framework 

3. CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Nature of the study 
This research adopted a longitudinal survey design. Sekaran {1992) defines a longitudinal study 
as a correlation based research study that involves repeated observations of the same items 
over long periods of time. Since the given study was largely descriptive, sample stat:stics were 
used to make generalization about population parameters. 
3.2. Population 
Portfolios -were formed using stock return data taken from Nairobi Securities Exchange. An 
equally weJghted :arithmetic average rate of return on all NSE listed securities was served as the 
market index. Th~ portfolios were formed from all listed companies at the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange, with particula.r consideration of the listing date or period- provided it was listed in 
the NSE as at January 2012- when the study was commenced, and is still listed up to and 
including January 2016- w~en the study was ended. 
3.3. Data Collection 
Secondary data was used arid this was adopted from the NSE List of companies. The companies 
were listed from J_anuary 2012 to January 2016. The study analyzed the stock prices over a 
period of 5 years on a monthly basis in order to establish monthly returns for the stocks. This 
data was obtained from the Nairobi Securities Exchange website where stock price data is 
recorded. This information was useful at calculating the betas of the stocks hence calculating 
their expected returns and the difference between the actual and expected return gave the 
abnormal return. 
3.4. Data Analysis 
Tools of Analysis 
The data was analyzed using Microsoft Excel 2010 and was used to generate the excess returns 
of the stocks, rank the stocks based on their excess returns, group the stocks into quintile 
portfolios based on their ranks: Top 5 and Bottom 5 portfolios and analyze their mean returns 
in order to generate a difference portfolio. 
Techniques of Analysis 
In order to analyze the data, autoregressive methods were used, which borrowed heavily from 
econometric methods i.e. Ordinary Least Squares method. Also, technical analysis, consistent 
with the Weak Form of EMH was used as an analysis technique to check for any historical 




3.4 .1. Model Specif!cation 
To effectively determine the consistency of the abnormal returns, the study used tests of 
market efficiency consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis to test on their significance or 
otherwise. Stocks listed on the NSE 20 were evaluated and their monthly returns analyzed. 
Moreover, the comparison between stock returns and abnormal returns was used as a founding 
basis to study overreaction through use of the overreaction hypothesis where mean reversion· 
is used as a precursor to overreaction- stocks with the highest positive returns under mean 
reversion record the most negative abnormal returns while stocks with the lowest positive 
returns record the most positive abnormal returns. Abnormal return was obtained as the 
difference between the stock's actual return and its expected return·. The stock expected return 
was obtained through the formula: 
E[Rs] = Rf + 8{Rm-Rf} 
Where E[Rs] =Expected Stock Return 
Rf ='Risk Free Rate 
8 =Beta 
Rm = Market Return 
·The returns were thus obtained for each and every stock over the 5 year period. Thereafter, the 
91 day T-Bill rate was obtained as it was ideally useful to provide the risk free rate. The 91-day T 
·;· Bill rate was converted using the same formula as the stock return and t his became the risk free 
rate to be used in the analyses. 
The proxy for the market was selected as the NSE-20 index and th.e returns of the NSE-20 index 
were obtained in a similar manner to the stock and risk free returns. 
·. Therefore, I ended up with three sets of returns- stock returns, ri.sk f !·ee returns and market 
returns. From then, I obtained the excess stock returns and the excess market returns. 
The excess rnarket return was obtained from the difference between the market return and the 
risk free return. The excess market return comprises the market premium which is the 
compensatory figure for risk e.g. market risk and was calculated over the 5 year pe,riod. 
The excess stock return was obtained from the difference between the stock return and the risk 
free return. The excess stock return comprises the premium which is the compensatory figure 
for both systematic risk that affects the· stock and idiosyncratic risk. The excess stock returns 
w~re· obtained for each of the 47 stocks over the 5 year period. 
3.4.2. Estimation of stock beta 
The stock beta is the measure of sensitivity of the stock to the market. It is obtained th rough 
the following: 
8 = (Rs-Rf)/(Rm-Rf) 
Where 8 = beta 
Rs =Stock Return 
Rm =Market Return 
Rf =Risk free Return 
3.4.3. Estimation of stock expected returns 
The stock betas obtained were used to calculate the stock expected returns based on the 
following formula: 
E[Rs] = R/+ 8{Rm-Rf) 
Where: 
E[Rs] =Expected Stock Return . 
Rf = Risk free rate 
8 = Beta coefficient 
Rm =Return of the market 
This formula was applied for the 47 stocks and the stocks' expected returns were obtained. The 
·betas underwent tests of significance to de~ermine their suitability and their accuracy at 
effectively estimating stock expectedreturns. 
3.4.4. Calculation of abnormal returns 
The abnormal returns were then calculated as the difference between the stocks' actual returns · 
and the stocks' expected returns. 
The significance of these abnormal returns was evaluated through regression against the excess 
market return to try and determine if the abnormal returns were within a trend of excess 
returns hence not significant or were above the trend of excess returns experienced by the 
market hence significant. for this, various coefficients were used to try and explain the 
r2lationship between the two variables. 
3.5. Tests for Overreaction 
In order to evaluate overreaction, a principle of mean reversion was invoked. According .to the 
overreaction hypothesis, mean reversion is experienced in the height of overreaction. This 
implies that stocks experiencing positive returns will in turn record negative excess returns and 
stocks experiencing negative or less positive returns will in turn record greater positive excess 
return. This implies that the average cumulative abnormal return is positive in the wake of 
overreaction hence one can beat the market through the use of an arbitrage portfolio. 
3.5.1. Formation of the winner, loser and arbitrage portfolios 
The various stocks in the NSE were analyzed and their monthly returns were ranked in 
descending order. The first five stocks formed the winner portfolio and the last five stocks 
formed the loser · portfolio. The average return of the highest return stocks comprised the 
winner portfolio's return, while the average return of the lowest return stocks comprised the 
los'er portfoHo's return. The arbitrage portfolio return comprised the difference between the 
winner portfolio's return and the loser's portfolio return . 
3.5.2. Cumulative abnormal return analysis 
The abnormal returns of the winner portfolio's stocks and the loser portfolio's ·:;tacks were 
obtained ·over the five year test period. These were then averaged monthly and each month's 
abnormal return was obtained, before being averaged for each entire portfolio. These were 
then termetl as the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) for both the winner and the 
loser portfolio. 
CAR for each stock 
CARi,j =sum (Rs- Rm) 
CARp,z,t = sum[{1/n)* sum (Rs- Rm)] 
Where CARi,j =Stock Cumulative Abnormal Return 
CARp,z,t =Portfolio Cumulative Abnormal Return 
N =number of stocks 
Rs =Return of stock 
Rm =Return of market 
ACAR for portfolios 
ACARp =[sum ( CARi,j)] /60 
Where ACARp =Portfolio Average Cumulative Abnormal Return 
The cumulative abnormal return for each stock was ranked side by side and the portfolios' 
returns were compared to the portfolios' abnormal returns. 
The null hypothesis for this test states that the ACARp = 0. This implies that the cumulative 
abnormal return of the portfolio is equal to zero for a set of actual returns hence there is no 




abnormal returns, or vice versa hence there is no overreaction. Hence, one cannot make 
I 
arbitrage returns from the arbitrage portfolio. 
The alternative hypothesis for this test states that the ACARp is not equal to zero. This implies 
that the cumulative ·abnormal return of the portfolio is greater than or less than zero for a set 
of actual returns hence there is mean reversion as the stock returns offset the cumulative 
abnormal return hence there is overreaction. Hence, one can make arbitrage returns from the 
arbitrage portfolio. 
To assess the statistical significance of t he Average Cumulative Abnormal Return for the stock, 
the T-statistic is defined as: 
Tp,t = [ACARp,tJI[Splsqrt(60)} 
Where Sp is the variance for the mean rnarket adjusted return [Rm- Rs] assuming time series 
independence of monthly mean returns. ARp,t denotes individual stock market adjusted return 
and mean{ARp,t) denotes mean market adjusted return for all stocks 
Sp = sqrt [((sum{ARp,t- mean(ARp,t)}A2)1 T -1} * sqrt{T)] 
To assess the statistical significance of the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return for the 
arbitrage portfolio, the T- statistic is defined as: 
T = {ACARi,t- ACARw,t) I sqrt{{2St}A2 IN} 
Where ACARi,t =loser portfolio average cumulative abnormal return 
ACARw,t =winner portfolio average cumulative abnormal return 
St = Sp =variancE! for the mean market adjusted return 
N =test period 
This methodology was what was useful in the data analysis that was carried out on the stocks in 
order to test the aforementioned research questions. 
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS 
4.1. Analysis Findings 
In order to obtain stock betas, linear regression was conducted on ead1 excess stock return 
against the excess market returns. A series of betas for the stocks with the largest variances in 
peak returns was obtained as follows: 
STOCK BETA REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
STOCK ALPHA BETA 
ARM -0.018314301 0:741014718 
BAMBURI CEMENT 0.027970812 0.136960984 
BARClAYS BANK 0.032622567 0.186824414 -
BOC KENYA 0.010613801 0.880486305 
BRIT AM 0.031188606 0.886146127 
l 
BAT 0.043061636 0.210330202 
CAR & GENERAL 0.03065698 0.168622366 
CARBACID -0.064916914 0. 780993404 
CENTUM 0.022493087- 0.890338755 
Upon analysis, the monthly returns were obtained. Forty seven regressions were carried out to 
obtain each stock's beta coefficient, which was then used to calculate the stock expected 
return. The difference between the actual stock return and the stock expected return yielded 
the abnormal return· for each stock. F-statistic tests for these stocks yielded a F-statistic of 
6.125546. 33 out of 47 stocks had F-values greater than 6.125546. 
For the 33 stocks, we reject the null hypothesis hence abnormal returns are consistent. For the 
remaining 14 stocks, we accept the null hypothesis that abnormal returns are inconsistent. 
Therefore, it is imperative for us to consider that the market is in the weak form of Efficient 
Market Hypothesis hence it has consistent abnormal returns for a large majority of its listed 
s.tocks. Below are the results of the stocks that had the largest variances in their peak returns 
an¢! the states in which they were considered : 
STOCK F- STATISTIC TABLE 
STOCK F- STATISTIC STATE 
ARM 13.37265 REJECT NULL HYPOTHESIS 
BAMBURI CEMENT 0.963689 ACCEPT NULL HYPOTHESIS 




.. , . 
152.5752 REJECT NULL HYPOTHESIS 
. - -- ··-· .. 
BRITAM .. 
.. 
. : .. 41.02877 REJECT NULL HYPOTHESIS . .. . . .•.. 
BAT 
.. 
0.865922 ACCEPT NULL HYPOTHESIS .. .. 
CAR AND GENERAL 18.45633 REJECT NULL HYPOTHESIS .. . 
The stocks tha't recorded the highest average return for the five year period were the fol lowing: 
WINNER QUINTILE PORTFOLIO 
Kenya Orchids. Ltd 4.81% 
Safari cora Ltd . 3.37% -
Unga Ltd 2.65% 
' 
Centum Investments 2.37% • I • . - . . . -
BAT 2.18% .. . .. 
. These stocks formed the winner quintile portfolio for this particular study. The winner portfolio 
had a mean average return of 3.08%. The stocks that recorded the lowest average ret'urn for 
the five year period were the following: · 
LOSER QUINTILE PORTFOLIO -
Carbacid . ~3.02% l 
Mumias Sugar ' -2.67% 
1 ARM j -2.40% 
Transcentury Ltd -1.66% 
Kenya Airways Ltd 
,., 
·-1.56% 
These stocks formed the loser quintile portfolio for this particular study. The loser portfolio had 
a mean average return of -2.28%. Moreover, the analysis of the abnormal returns was also 
calculated on these ten stocks. The stocks that comprised having the highest cumulative 
abnormal returns among the ten stocks were. the following: 
. I 
ADJUSTED WINNER QUINTILE PORTFOLIO 
Kenya Orchids Ltd 11.77% 
Transcentury Ltd 8.58% 
Safaricom ~td 7.92% I 
BAT 4.53% ' 
Centum Investment 3.29% 
Out of the stocks, fou·r out of five stocks with the highest returns recorded the highest 
cumulative abnormal return . The Average Cumulative Abnormal Return {ACAR) for these stocks 
was 7.22%. 80% of the stocks in the Winner portfolio formed ' the portfolio of stocks that 
recorded the highest Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (ACAR). The stocks that comprised 
having the lowest cumu.lativ~ abnormal returns among the ~en stocks were the following: · 
i 
I 
ADJUSTED LOSER QUINTILE PORTFOLIO 
Carbacid -5.65% 
Kenya Airways Ltd . -2.05% 
Unga Ltd . 
' 
-1.98% 
ARM -1.01% . .. 
Mumias Sugar Ltd -0.04% 
Out of the stock?, · four out of five stocks with the lowest returns recorded the lowest 
cumulative abnormal return. The Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (ACAR} for these stocks 
was -2.15%. 80% of the stocks in the loser portfolio formed the portfolio of stocks that 
recorded the lowest Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (ACAR). 
The arbitrage portfolio return, formed on the difference between the mean average return of 
the winner portfolio -and the mean average return of the loser portfolio was found to be 5.36% . 
. This would be the return an investor would make should there be any form of mean reversion, 
an indication of overreaction. The weighted return that the arbitrage portfolio would be 
· required to make in order to take advantage of any mispricingdue to other factors other than 
overreaction i.e. in absence of mean reversion hence no overreaction, would be 9.36%. This is 
,. arrived at as the difference between the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return of the adjusted 
winner portfolio and the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return of the adjusted loser portfolio. 
Tests of significance were carried out on the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns and yielded 
the following outcomes: , 
TABLE OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
5-p .- 0.26890775 
T-stat Lower Quintile ACAR -0.618161602 ACCEPT NULL HYPOTHESIS 
T_;stat UpperQuintile ACAR 2.079166096 REJECT NULL HYPOTHESIS 
T-stat Value -0.685300268 
From analysis, it was observed that the loser quintile portfolio recorded less negative abn,ormal 
returns in comparison to its average return hence mean reversion was observed. As a result the 
· · null hypothesis -of the study was acceptable that there was some degree of overreaction 
occurring in the lower quintile as shown through its T-statistic. 
On the other. hand, the winner quintile portfolio recorded greater positive abnormal returns in 
comparison to its average return hence mean reversion was not observed within this portfolio. 
As a r~sult, ·it was prudent to reject the null hypothesis of the study as there was insufficient 
evidence to support any form of overreaction as shown through its T-statistic. 
As a result, it would be possible for an investor holding the arbitrage portfolio (5.36%) to make 
arbitrage : returns provided that the benchmark was the loser quintile portfolio (-2.15%). 
\ .. .. 
. , 
However, it would be impossible for an investor holding an arbitrage portfolio (5.36%) to make 
arbitrage ~returns provided that the benchm.ark was the winner quintile portfolio (7.22%) . 

l ·. 
ADJUSTED LOSER QUINTILE PORTFOLIO 
Carbacid -5.65% 
Kenya Airways Ltd . -2.05% 
Unga Ltd -1.98% 
ARM 
.. -1.01% . . 
Mumias Sugar Ltd -0.04% 
Out of the stocks, - four out of five stocks with the lowest returns recorded the lowest 
cumulative abnormal return. The Average Cumulative Abnormal Return {ACAR) for these stocks 
was -2.15%. 80% of the stocks in the loser portfolio formed the portfolio of stocks that 
recorded t he lowest Average Cumulative Abnormal Return {ACAR). 
The arbitrage portfolio return, formed on the difference between the mean average return of 
the winner portfolio and the mean average return of the loser portfolio was found to be 5.36% . 
. This would be the return an investor would make should there be any form of mean reversion, 
an indication of overreaction. The weighted return that the arbitrage portfolio would be 
required to make in order to take advantage of any mispricing due to other factors other than 
overreaction i.e. in absence of mean reversion hence no overreaction, would be 9.36%. This is 
,. arrived at as the difference between the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return of the adjusted 
winner portfolio and the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return of the adjusted loser portfolio. 
Tests of significance were carried out on the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns and yielded 
the following outcomes: 
TABLE OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
5-p 0.26890775 
T-stat Lower Quintile ACAR -0.618161602 ACCEPT NULL HYPOTHESIS 
T-stat Upper Quintile ACAR 2.079166096 REJECT NULL HYPOTHESIS 
T-stat Value -0.685300268 
From analysis, it was observed that the loser quintile portfolio recorded less negative abnormal 
returns in Comparison to its average return hence mean reversion was observed . As a result the 
· null hypothesis of the study was acceptable that there was some degree of overreaction 
occurring in the lower quintile as shown through its T-statistic. 
On the other hand, the winner quintile portfolio recorded greater positive abnormal returns in 
comparison to its average return hence mean reversion was not observed within this portfolio. 
As a result, it was prudent to reject the null hypothesis of the study as there was insufficient 
evidence to support any form of overreaction as shown through its T-statistic. 
As a result, it would be possible for an investor holding the arbitrage portfolio {5.36%} to make 
arbitrage returns provided that the benchmark was the loser quintile portfolio (-2.15%). 
However, it would be impossible for an investor holding an arbitrage portfolio {5.36%) to make 
arbitrage "returns provided that the benchmark was the winner quintile portfolio {7.22%). 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1. Discussions 
The findings of this study were consistent with Soares {2005), who studied overreaction and 
underreaction in the Portuguese Stock Exchange. In both studies, the markets were strongly 
subject to behavioral biases that affected the rationale of investor decisions. He_nce, behavioral 
elements e.g. behavioral biases like loss aversion played an important role in several of the 
investments experienced in the NSE between January 2012 and January 2016. Moreover, both 
exchanges experienced overreaction in times of losses, and this was consistent with . the 
prospect theory findings that investors are risk averse in times of gains and risk seeking in the 
event of losses .. Hence, overreaction was being experienced in the loser quintile portfolio of 
the Kenyan study as investors were taking up greater risk to minimize their losses, while no 
overreaction was experienced in the winner quintile portfolio as investors were risk averse in 
order to safeguard their gains from potential loss, a characteristic known as loss aversion. 
I 
In addition, abnormal returns were persistent in both markets. However, in that study, Soares 
{2005), observed underreaction in the case of gains, whereas the Kenyan market experienced 
fairly normal reactions in the case of gains . . Through analysis, it has been observed that a large 
majority of the listed stocks in the Nairobi Stock Exchange {33 out of 47 stocks) experienced 
persistent abnormal returns hence it was affirmative that the market was in the weak form of 
efficiency. Hence, one could take advantage of the stock market through use of technical 
analysis as the stock price majorly reflected information from the past in order to make 
consistent abnormal returns. 
Also, the Portuguese market seemed t o be more efficient as compared to the Kenyan market as 
the market was in the semi-strong form of efficiency as compared to the Kenyan market which 
was in the weak form of efficiency. Furthermore, the impact of legislation was much stronger in 
the Portuguese economy as compared to the Kenyan economy as the government actively 
" stepped in to incentivise investors to moderate the reactions in the case of underreaction in the 
.- gains whereas in the Kenyan economy government impact was minimal. 
5.2. Conclusions 
The study aimed to answer the following two questions. The first question was whether the 
abnormal returns experienced in the Nairobi Stock Exchange were persistent to affirm that the 
market was in the weak form of efficiency. Hence through analysis, it was proved that the 
abnormal returns were persistent hence the market was in its weak form of efficiency. 
The second question, which was the focal point of this . study, was whether investor 
overreaction was a driver in the consistent abnormal returns experienced in the NSE. Through 
analysis, the Prospect Theory came into play as we were able to observe some degree 
overreaction in the loser quintile portfolio, which particularly had 'negative returns {losses) and 
no overreaction in the winner quintile portfolio, which particularly had positive returns {gains). 
This outcome was strongly consistent with the Prospect Theory which outlines that investors 
are convex {risk seeking) in losses and concave (risk averse) in gains. 
Moreover, it was concluded that the efficiency of the market had a significant part to play in 
the degree of overreaction experienced in the NSE between January 2012 and January 2016. 
With the market being in its weak form of efficiency, it implied that the stock prices majorly 
reflected historical information, and hence there was ability to make greater returns through 
use of technical analysis. As a result, abnormal returns were consistently made over the test 
peHod and were significant. 
I 
,\ 
· All in al!, this study·'highlighted the importance of behavioral elements in investor decision 
making and the impact of a weakly efficient market in overemphasizing behavioral biases e.g. 
overreaction and loss aversion. 
5.2. Recommendations 
The improvement of the efficiency of the stock market is paramount towards minimizing the 
potential impact of behavioral elements on investment decisions made at the NSE. Stock prices 
should be· able to come in' in a random fashion and incorporate all available information. In this 
manner, the abnormal returns will not be consistent and trading can occur in a random fashion, 
hence this will cause investors to think in a rational manner in order to make positive returns 
from trading in the stock market. Therefore, the Nairobi Stock Exchange could benefit from 
system enhancements to enable stock prices incorporate and reflect all available informatio~ to 
the best ability possible thus improving market efficiency. 
Investor education:is also of keen importance in order to improve their capacity to think and act 
rationally, rather than overreacting in the case of losses and being loss averse .in the c.ase of 
gains. Hence, they will have adequate knowledge to select value stocks or growth stocks based 
on their investment strategy, time horizon and risk tolerance. This in turn will minimize 
overreaction as investors will invest in portfolios that meet their unique investor characterist ics 
and risk profiles. 
The utilization of hedging strategies can also be useful at curbing overreaction among investors 
as this can minimize the negative returns {losses} experienced hence minimize overreaci:1on 
tendencies by offsetting the effects of transaction risk that is experienced in the losses, hence 
reducing the amOunt of additional risk that investors would take up to offset the transaction 
risk experienced in the losses. These strategies could include use of forwards, futures, swaps 
and money market hedging strategies in order to minimize the losses experienced. 
Finally, government involvement could play an important role in minimizing overreaction. From 
providing conducive trading conditions through political stability to regulation e.g. progressive 
capital gains taxes-on abnormal returns and tax reliefs on losses, the government can play an 
important role in stabilizing the economy hence minimizing potential of overreaction among 
investors. 
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